Add 80% limit warning, stop repeat notifications, fix review findings

Notifications:
- Warn once when a counter reaches warn_percent of its limit, through
  separate warn_*_url endpoints.
- Write ntf/ markers so a lost Redis reply cannot re-send a breach.
- Retry only when the request never left or the web app answered 429/5xx.

Fixes:
- Retry transactions Redis rejected; treat pool timeouts as definite.
- Install the signal handler before startup work.
- Stop logging the login suffix; redact notify URL credentials.
- Reject corrupt or empty CDBs, truncated hash tables included.
- Require a Sentinel password, refuse example placeholders, and default
  admin_addr to localhost.
- Normalise /counters domains, count on the arrival day, log rejections,
  hide internals in errors and exit 1 on a failed drain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Dimitrije Dimitrijevic
2026-11-09 09:01:56 +01:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent c43ff17627
commit 54f9626121
29 changed files with 1673 additions and 245 deletions
+120 -23
View File
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ type Planner struct {
Exempt map[string]bool // lowercased addresses that never count
CountJunk bool // count /in requests flagged junk
Now func() time.Time // nil = time.Now; the UTC day of Now() is the counter day
// WarnPercent is the share of a limit that triggers an early warning; 0 = off.
WarnPercent int64
}
// Job is one validated request handed to the queue: the fields the counting
@@ -66,9 +68,9 @@ type Job struct {
TraceID string
Received time.Time // when the request arrived (queue wait metric)
AuthUser string // /out: normalised SMTP AUTH user, "" when not usable
LoginSuffix string // /out: "SUPPORTTOKEN" of a user@dom@SUPPORTTOKEN login
MailFrom string // normalised, or the sanitised input when not an address
AuthUser string // /out: normalised SMTP AUTH user, "" when not usable
TokenLogin bool // /out: a user@dom@SUFFIX login
MailFrom string // normalised, or the sanitised input when not an address
// MailFromUsable tells whether MailFrom is a normalised address (and may
// match the exempt list); an unusable value is never exempt.
MailFromUsable bool
@@ -107,20 +109,21 @@ type Increment struct {
By string // address that caused it (sender for o, recipient for i); $ADDRESS in notifications
Limit int64 // configured limit, 0 when unlimited
Limited bool // false when no limit is configured for this level/flow
WarnAt int64 // counter value that triggers the early warning, 0 = none
Domain *domains.Domain
}
// Plan is the result of applying the rules to one request.
type Plan struct {
Route string
TraceID string
Date string // UTC day used in the keys
Skipped string // "" or one of the Skip* reasons
AuthUser string
LoginSuffix string
MailFrom string
Recipient string
Junk bool // /in only: the message was flagged junk by mizu
Route string
TraceID string
Date string // UTC day used in the keys
Skipped string // "" or one of the Skip* reasons
AuthUser string
TokenLogin bool
MailFrom string
Recipient string
Junk bool // /in only: the message was flagged junk by mizu
Unusable []Unusable // sides that were not counted because they failed validation
Lookups []Lookup
@@ -166,8 +169,12 @@ func (p *Planner) Plan(job Job) (*Plan, error) {
if job.MailFromUsable {
mailFrom = normalize(mailFrom)
}
plan := &Plan{Route: job.Route, TraceID: job.TraceID, Date: store.DayKey(p.now()),
AuthUser: authUser, LoginSuffix: job.LoginSuffix, MailFrom: mailFrom, Recipient: recipient, Junk: job.Junk}
counted := job.Received
if counted.IsZero() {
counted = p.now()
}
plan := &Plan{Route: job.Route, TraceID: job.TraceID, Date: store.DayKey(counted),
AuthUser: authUser, TokenLogin: job.TokenLogin, MailFrom: mailFrom, Recipient: recipient, Junk: job.Junk}
if job.SenderUnusable.Set() {
plan.Unusable = append(plan.Unusable, job.SenderUnusable)
}
@@ -234,11 +241,33 @@ func (p *Planner) add(plan *Plan, role, address, flow string) error {
Level: l.level, ID: l.id, Flow: flow,
Key: store.Key(l.level, l.id, plan.Date, flow),
By: address, Limit: limit, Limited: limited, Domain: d,
WarnAt: warnAt(limit, limited, p.WarnPercent),
})
}
return nil
}
func warnAt(limit int64, limited bool, percent int64) int64 {
if !limited {
return 0
}
return WarnThreshold(limit, percent)
}
// WarnThreshold returns the counter value at which percent of limit is used,
// rounded up, or 0 when no warning applies: warnings are off, there is no
// positive limit, or the threshold is not below the limit itself.
func WarnThreshold(limit, percent int64) int64 {
if limit <= 0 || percent <= 0 {
return 0
}
t := limit/100*percent + (limit%100*percent+99)/100
if t >= limit {
return 0
}
return t
}
// Crossed reports whether an increment of amount that produced newValue is
// the one that reached limit: old < limit <= new. Because INCRBY is atomic
// exactly one increment can cross, so this is the once-per-crossing trigger
@@ -251,8 +280,12 @@ func Crossed(newValue, amount, limit int64) bool {
type Result struct {
Increment
Count int64 // value after the increment (from EXEC, or re-read after a lost reply)
Reached bool // this increment crossed the limit
Reached bool // this increment crossed the limit and is the one to notify
Warned bool // this increment crossed the warning threshold and is the one to notify
Err error // this key's own INCR failed (e.g. it holds a non-number); Count is 0
// MarkerErr is set when the notification marker could not be read or
// written. After a lost reply the notification is then withheld.
MarkerErr error
}
// Outcome is an executed Plan.
@@ -269,6 +302,9 @@ type Counter struct {
Planner *Planner
Store *store.Store
ReReadTimeout time.Duration // budget for the master re-read after a lost reply (default 2s)
// AbortRetryDelay is the pause before the single retry of a transaction
// Redis rejected, e.g. during a failover (default 200ms).
AbortRetryDelay time.Duration
}
// CountOut plans and executes an /out request.
@@ -293,12 +329,17 @@ func (c *Counter) CountIn(ctx context.Context, traceID, mailFrom, recipient stri
// not touch Redis.
//
// Failure handling (review #4): a key whose own INCR failed is reported in
// its Result.Err while the other keys are counted normally. When the whole
// reply was lost (timeout, reset) after the write may have been applied, the
// keys are re-read once from the master and the outcome is flagged Unknown;
// crossing detection then uses count >= limit so a crossing that happened in
// the lost transaction is still notified. A definite failure (connection
// refused, cancelled) is returned as an error: nothing was counted.
// its Result.Err while the other keys are counted normally. A transaction
// Redis rejected as a whole applied nothing and is retried once. When the
// whole reply was lost (timeout, reset) after the write may have been applied,
// the keys are re-read once from the master and the outcome is flagged
// Unknown. A definite failure (connection refused, cancelled) is returned as
// an error: nothing was counted.
//
// Notifications go out once per counter: a confirmed crossing is exact, so it
// always fires and writes a marker. After a lost reply the crossing cannot be
// pinned to this increment, so it fires only for the caller that wins the
// marker, and a counter that already notified stays silent.
func (c *Counter) Execute(ctx context.Context, plan *Plan) (*Outcome, error) {
out := &Outcome{Plan: plan}
if len(plan.Increments) == 0 {
@@ -309,13 +350,15 @@ func (c *Counter) Execute(ctx context.Context, plan *Plan) (*Outcome, error) {
keys[i] = inc.Key
}
out.Results = make([]Result, len(plan.Increments))
results, err := c.Store.Incr(ctx, keys)
results, err := c.incr(ctx, keys)
if err == nil {
for i, inc := range plan.Increments {
r := Result{Increment: inc, Err: results[i].Err}
if r.Err == nil {
r.Count = results[i].Count
r.Reached = inc.Limited && Crossed(r.Count, 1, inc.Limit)
r.Warned = Crossed(r.Count, 1, inc.WarnAt)
c.mark(ctx, plan.Date, &r)
}
out.Results[i] = r
}
@@ -332,11 +375,65 @@ func (c *Counter) Execute(ctx context.Context, plan *Plan) (*Outcome, error) {
}
out.Unknown = err
for i, inc := range plan.Increments {
out.Results[i] = Result{Increment: inc, Count: counts[i], Reached: inc.Limited && counts[i] >= inc.Limit}
r := Result{Increment: inc, Count: counts[i]}
switch {
case inc.Limited && inc.Limit > 0 && r.Count >= inc.Limit:
r.Reached = c.claim(rctx, plan.Date, &r, store.MarkerLimit)
case inc.WarnAt > 0 && r.Count >= inc.WarnAt:
r.Warned = c.claim(rctx, plan.Date, &r, store.MarkerWarn)
}
out.Results[i] = r
}
return out, nil
}
// incr runs the transaction and retries it once when Redis rejected it.
func (c *Counter) incr(ctx context.Context, keys []string) ([]store.IncrResult, error) {
results, err := c.Store.Incr(ctx, keys)
if !errors.Is(err, store.ErrNotApplied) {
return results, err
}
select {
case <-time.After(c.abortRetryDelay()):
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil, err
}
return c.Store.Incr(ctx, keys)
}
// mark records a confirmed crossing. A failure is reported but the
// notification still goes out, because this crossing is certain.
func (c *Counter) mark(ctx context.Context, date string, r *Result) {
if !r.Reached && !r.Warned {
return
}
kind := store.MarkerLimit
if r.Warned {
kind = store.MarkerWarn
}
mctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), c.reReadTimeout())
defer cancel()
r.MarkerErr = c.Store.MarkNotified(mctx, store.MarkerKey(r.Level, r.ID, date, r.Flow, kind))
}
// claim takes the marker after a lost reply. If that fails nothing is sent:
// a missed notification is preferred to a repeated one.
func (c *Counter) claim(ctx context.Context, date string, r *Result, kind string) bool {
won, err := c.Store.ClaimNotified(ctx, store.MarkerKey(r.Level, r.ID, date, r.Flow, kind))
if err != nil {
r.MarkerErr = err
return false
}
return won
}
func (c *Counter) abortRetryDelay() time.Duration {
if c.AbortRetryDelay > 0 {
return c.AbortRetryDelay
}
return 200 * time.Millisecond
}
func (c *Counter) reReadTimeout() time.Duration {
if c.ReReadTimeout > 0 {
return c.ReReadTimeout