First commit Go counter service

This commit is contained in:
Dimitrije Dimitrijevic
2026-10-15 02:12:18 +02:00
commit c43ff17627
59 changed files with 11205 additions and 0 deletions
+212
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
package server
import (
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"mime"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"runtime/debug"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"migadu_counters/internal/api"
)
// maxBody bounds every request body (the biggest legitimate body is a few
// hundred bytes).
const maxBody = 64 << 10
// httpError is a rejection by the validation layer.
type httpError struct {
status int
msg string
}
func (e *httpError) Error() string { return e.msg }
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}
func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, msg string) {
writeJSON(w, status, api.ErrorResponse{Error: msg})
}
// reject answers an httpError and logs it: a burst of 4xx from mailqueuer
// means contract drift or a token mismatch.
func (s *Server) reject(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, route string, e *httpError) {
writeError(w, e.status, e.msg)
s.d.Logger.Warn("request rejected", "route", route, "remote", r.RemoteAddr, "status", e.status, "reason", e.msg)
}
// statusWriter captures the status code for metrics.
type statusWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
status int
}
func (w *statusWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
if w.status == 0 {
w.status = code
}
w.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
}
func (w *statusWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
if w.status == 0 {
w.status = http.StatusOK
}
return w.ResponseWriter.Write(p)
}
// recoverer keeps the daemon alive when a handler panics. It sits outside
// http.TimeoutHandler, which re-panics in the caller's goroutine.
func (s *Server) recoverer(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
defer func() {
if p := recover(); p != nil {
s.d.Logger.Error("panic in handler", "panic", fmt.Sprint(p), "path", r.URL.Path, "stack", string(debug.Stack()))
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal error")
}
}()
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// observe records request metrics per route and status.
func (s *Server) observe(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
start := time.Now()
sw := &statusWriter{ResponseWriter: w}
next.ServeHTTP(sw, r)
if sw.status == 0 {
sw.status = http.StatusOK
}
route := r.URL.Path
switch route {
case "/in", "/out", "/counters":
default:
route = "other"
}
if s.d.Metrics != nil {
s.d.Metrics.RecordRequest(route, strconv.Itoa(sw.status), time.Since(start).Seconds())
}
})
}
// route applies the validation steps common to every endpoint, in order:
// method, declared body size, bearer token, source IP, content type (POST).
func (s *Server) route(path, method string, h http.HandlerFunc) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != method {
w.Header().Set("Allow", method)
s.reject(w, r, path, &httpError{http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "method not allowed"})
return
}
if r.ContentLength > maxBody {
s.reject(w, r, path, &httpError{http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, "request body too large"})
return
}
if e := s.checkAuth(r); e != nil {
w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer")
s.reject(w, r, path, e)
return
}
if e := s.checkSource(r); e != nil {
s.reject(w, r, path, e)
return
}
if method == http.MethodPost {
if e := checkContentType(r); e != nil {
s.reject(w, r, path, e)
return
}
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxBody)
}
h(w, r)
})
}
func (s *Server) checkAuth(r *http.Request) *httpError {
if s.d.AuthToken == "" {
return nil // config.Warnings() flags this at startup
}
const prefix = "Bearer "
h := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
if !strings.HasPrefix(h, prefix) {
return &httpError{http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized"}
}
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(h[len(prefix):])), []byte(s.d.AuthToken)) != 1 {
return &httpError{http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized"}
}
return nil
}
// checkSource matches RemoteAddr (never X-Forwarded-For: nothing proxies
// mailqueuer's calls) against allowed_cidrs when configured.
func (s *Server) checkSource(r *http.Request) *httpError {
if len(s.d.AllowedCIDRs) == 0 {
return nil
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
host = r.RemoteAddr
}
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host)
if err != nil {
return &httpError{http.StatusForbidden, "source address not allowed"}
}
addr = addr.Unmap()
for _, p := range s.d.AllowedCIDRs {
if p.Contains(addr) {
return nil
}
}
return &httpError{http.StatusForbidden, "source address not allowed"}
}
func checkContentType(r *http.Request) *httpError {
mt, _, err := mime.ParseMediaType(r.Header.Get("Content-Type"))
if err != nil || mt != "application/json" {
return &httpError{http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType, "Content-Type must be application/json"}
}
return nil
}
// decodeJSON reads exactly one JSON object into dst. Unknown fields are
// ignored so mailqueuer can add fields without breaking counting.
func decodeJSON(r *http.Request, dst any) *httpError {
dec := json.NewDecoder(r.Body)
if err := dec.Decode(dst); err != nil {
var tooBig *http.MaxBytesError
if errors.As(err, &tooBig) {
return &httpError{http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, "request body too large"}
}
return &httpError{http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid json: " + err.Error()}
}
if err := dec.Decode(&struct{}{}); err != io.EOF {
var tooBig *http.MaxBytesError
if errors.As(err, &tooBig) {
return &httpError{http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, "request body too large"}
}
return &httpError{http.StatusBadRequest, "body must contain exactly one JSON object"}
}
return nil
}
// logger returns the configured logger or slog's default.
func (d Deps) logger() *slog.Logger {
if d.Logger != nil {
return d.Logger
}
return slog.Default()
}